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THE INTERNATIONAL REACH OF AMERICAN
REGULATORY LEGISLATION
DONALD T. TRAUTMAN*
I
INTRODUCTION
In an era of international economic cooperation, many consider it
perverse for the United States to apply its law, of which the antitrust
laws have perhaps attracted the most attention, to foreign activities
and to foreign nationals in countries whose law tolerates or promotes
what we proscribe.' The argument ranges over many complicated fields
of law and politics. This paper seeks to deal with only one of those
fields, one which this paper seeks to prove is almost irrelevant to the
controversy, but one which seems often to occupy the center of the
stage. Perhaps it does so because it makes for good drama: its thesis
is provocative and diverting. The argument is that the United States
has neither the power nor any justification under existing doctrines of
jurisdictional propriety to apply its law beyond its borders. This paper
seeks to establish by analysis of several areas of regulation that there
is and can be no such inherent limitation. It seeks to show, as a
corollary, that conflicts thinking has provided significant informing
principles in the interpretation of regulatory legislation. Whether or
not the extensions of jurisdiction in various areas have been wise,
whether or not jurisdiction should have been exercised, experience in
many areas shows that the problems are too complicated to be solved
satisfactorily by analysis running solely in terms of geographical
boundaries.
In American practice, the question ordinarily arises as one of in-
terpretation. Many federal regulatory statutes contain jurisdictional
language that is as sweeping as the regulation in the Sherman Act of
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1 See, e.g., Haight, "International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-
trust Laws," 63 Yale LJ. 639 (1954); Whitney, "Sources of Conflict Between Inter-
national Law and the Antitrust Laws," 63 Yale L.J. 655 (1954). It would be supereroga-
tory for this paper to deal with the "extraterritorial" application of antitrust laws. In
addition to these articles, see Carlston, "Antitrust Policy Abroad," 49 Nw. U.L. Rev.
569 (1954) ; Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1452 (1956) ; and, in particular, Brewster, "Antitrust
and American Business Abroad," c. 11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as BREWSTER], in
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"trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations."
Judges are constantly called upon to decide what limits there are to
the apparent universality of such language. To put a concrete case, a
Danish seaman who has signed on a Danish ship in Copenhagen and is
injured in a Danish port is hardly the concern of Congress and yet
comes literally within the Jones Act, which provides compensation for
"zany seaman who shall suffer injury in the course of his employment."
Our power to define the remedy for the Danish sailor in this case is
rarely tested, because it is obvious, entirely apart from any external
limitations as might be provided by either the Constitution of the
United States or international law and practice, that Congress could
not have intended to reach this transaction. Without clearly distinguish-
ing between power and intent, conventional idiom has it that there is
nothing in the case to bring the injury within the "territorial jurisdic-
tion" of the United States.
American regulation is not ordinarily invoked unless someone or
something American is involved, and the true question is whether resort
to the geographical analysis implied in the notion of territorial jurisdic-
tion is satisfactory when some significant American element is in-
volved. Then, constitutional or international law hurdles lose any force
they may have had,2 and the question which the judge faces is how
far Congress wanted to go, or would have wanted to go had it con-
sidered that the jurisdictional language it used did not exclude transac-
tions in which foreign activities predominate. Strictly the job of the
judge is to apply the statute within the limits laid down by Congress.
As is often the case in other respects, here too the language of federal
regulation is rarely precise. In many of the statutes considered in this
paper, the only relevant language is that defining the commerce af-
fected. Of course, when legislation represents an exercise of the power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, some commercial connec-
tion with the United States must be found. But apart from that qualifi-
cation, there seems to be little guidance. The formulas vary in specific-
ity and artistry of draftsmanship, but no particular pattern emerges. 3
In the main, the job of circumscribing the international reach of federal
regulation, which ordinarily in terms applies to all transactions having
some commercial connection with the United States, has been left to
the judge.
It is the purpose of this paper to analyze judicial decisions inter-
preting broad congressional language and limiting its jurisdictional
2 International law limitations are discussed throughout the body of this paper.
That they operate primarily as aids in construction was suggested as early as 1804.
See The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (U.S. 1804); cf., The Exchange, 7 Cranch
116, 135, 146 (1812).
3 For a detailed listing of typical formulas, see BREWSTER, 313 n. 3.
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reach. In particular, the analysis will be undertaken from the stand-
point of one who has worked primarily in the field of conflict of laws.
The questions that emerge are, in this light, ones of identifying points
of similarity and difference between the various traditional and mod-
ern approaches to conflict of laws on the one hand and a traditional
and functional approach to the question of the appropriate scope of
application of American economic regulation. Thus in part the ques-
tion is whether the cases can rationally be explained without resort to
the often subtle and delicate inquiries compelled by modern conflict-of-
laws thinking. At least one or two recent decisions, which the purist
must regard as unfortunate, suggest that statutory interpretation may
appropriately merge with conflict-of-laws thinking. In Lauritzen v.
Larsen,4 for example, the Supreme Court addressed itself to the prob-
lem. It was enough there to pose a problem that a Danish seaman on
a Danish ship who had been injured in foreign waters had signed on
in New York City. Compensation under the Jones Act was denied, but
the Court not only assumed that Congress had the power to make the
Jones Act applicable but gave the case full consideration. To many
the result may seem easy, but the Court found no easy formula. Its
opinion suggests that a wide variety of factors may come to bear on
the decision whether the universal language Congress has used causes
economic regulatory measures to apply "abroad." Analogies may be
drawn from international law, from American rules of the conflict of
laws, from constitutional law cases dealing with "legislative jurisdic-
tion" or "jurisdiction over the subject matter," as well as from the
substance of the regulation. Reliance has been placed at various times
on principles drawn from all of these areas. In Lauritzen v. Larsen,
for example, the Court found it relevant to discuss the international
law notion that a ship is a part of the territory whose flag it flies, the
choice-of-law rules for contract and tort, constitutional definitions of
legislative jurisdiction and the purpose of the Jones Act. This paper
will attempt to suggest how courts have brought these various notions
into harmony.
One problem posed by a decision such as that in the Lauritzen
case is whether all traditional dogma are to be abandoned and a new
approach fashioned. If there is to be a new approach, can the shifting
and uncertain premises of conflict of laws be relied on, and will better
4 345 U.S. 571 (1953). There a Danish seaman temporarily in New York City
signed on a Danish ship in New York, and was injured by the negligence of a fellow
sailor in Havana. The stipulation as to Danish law, R. 20, indicates that the statutory
recovery in Denmark is quite limited when the injury is caused by the negligence of a
fellow seaman. In this action for recovery under the Jones Act, although payments had
been made in accordance with Danish law, the Supreme Court held the Jones Act in-
applicable.
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appreciation of conflict-of-laws problems conduce toward more precise
thinking in the area of "statutory interpretation?" Because the author
thinks that the conflict of laws is undergoing fundamental and de-
sirable change, change that can be of immeasurable assistance in the
process of understanding the context in which Congressional legisla-
tion occurs, it seems that much more important to explain why identifi-
cation of activity within the jurisdiction, or a hold on the basis of
nationality, domicile, or whatever else, can at times be insufficient. At
the same time, it seems very important to attempt to give some struct-
ure, framework and functional basis for what has occurred, if indeed
it can be rationally explained. Since the author believes that the de-
cisions are far more rational than their rationalizations in the com-
mentary, separate identification of the various factors listed and dis-
cussed by the courts seems appropriate. It also seems helpful to
acknowledge that various factors rank differently in importance. It
would be unthinkable that the law were otherwise.
Certainly the factors traditionally regarded as necessary to estab-
lish a satisfactory legislative hold, such as the hold over the person
based on citizenship or residence, or the hold based on the initiation and
execution of activity within the country, remain of significance and
often command greater respect than other factors. Concurrence of two
or more may be decisive. Without seeking to minimize the role such
factors play, this paper analyzes what happens in the doubtful cases.
It seems useful, by way of preliminary exploration of the problem, to
suggest at the outset the ways in which a conflicts analysis could be
of assistance.
Choice-of-law rules may be drawn on to determine which of
two or three concerned jurisdictions ought to have the final say. Choice-
of-law notions may also be drawn on to determine the significance of
a particular factor, such as citizenship, to the particular regulation
involved; the place where a person is injured may have a superior
claim so far as liability for conduct is concerned, while the place whose
citizen is injured may be more concerned with compensating him and
with regulation of activity affecting the government itself in its domes-
tic or foreign affairs. This type of analysis is relatively simple and
widely used today in conflicts thinking.
If such analysis were insufficient to resolve the doubt, resort to
other perhaps less familiar types of choice-of-law analysis might be of
assistance in the final determination that it is proper to regulate any
particular transaction. In Lauritzen v. Larsen, the Court took occasion
to refer to the Danish compensation system, although even as scholar-
ly a judicial gentleman as Justice Jackson failed, perhaps because
there it was unnecessary, to suggest how a court might deal with the
1961]
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fact that the Danish legislation, albeit quite similar to ours, gave
substantially less relief than our law when the injury was caused
by a fellow seaman. If our laws are the same in substance as the laws
of an interested foreign nation, use of our law would surely involve
less putative affront to the "sovereignty" of that nation. At the same
time, there might be no significant American interest which would not
be fully vindicated by the foreign law. As legislative policy diverges,
the potentiality of offense might increase, but, by the same token, the
inclination of the United States to apply its own law, which it pre-
sumably prefers, might also become greater. Finally, and perhaps
particularly in matters of regulation which affect commerce among
nations of the free world, practical and official diplomacy might pull
us up short. It may not be enough to prefer application of our law
because the foreign rule is not an adequate substitute. There may
emerge a judge-made Golden Rule to promote respect for our laws
abroad or to avoid a basis for retaliation. Direct advice from the Ex-
ecutive based on reasons of official diplomacy may also demand re-
straint.
The subject matter involved might also play a part in defining
our jurisdictional reach. For example, legislation regulating and penal-
izing conduct which interferes with the process of government may
reach out further than legislation conferring rights on private in-
dividuals. Treason, counterfeiting, or smuggling may be within reach
no matter how remote the scene of the crime.5
Finally, at the heart of the controversy over application of our
law abroad, and consequently over the weight to be given various fac-
tors, is a fundamental question of approach which is too often over-
looked. Failure to recognize it has aggravated much of the dispute.
The question is whether we are concerned with finding the most ap-
propriate law to govern a transaction or simply with the sufficiency
of the legislative concern of the United States. If the question is simply
one of an appropriate legislative concern, there is a possibility that
several jurisdictions will find themselves competent to regulate. It was
plain, for example, in Lauritzen v. Larsen, that by any usual test
Denmark was justified in granting relief to the seaman there involved,
and that we were being called on to afford additional relief. One alter-
native is to treat the problem like a choice-of-law problem and insist
on the self-restraint imposed by a search for the most appropriate law.
If, however, we find that other countries in fact do little to avoid
multiple regulation, do we then abandon our effort to find a single
5 No attempt will be made here to deal with each substantive area. The focus will
simply be on some of the important factors affecting judicial decision as they appear
in some areas of federal regulation.
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regulating rule and limit our inquiry to establishing the minimum
relationship adequate to support the imposition of our own regulatory
policy? Recognizing the possibility of occasional divergence because of
honest disagreement or calculated provincialism, we might, nonethe-
less, adopt as our policy a unitary approach and govern our own
behavior on the premise that each country, in cooperation with others,
will attempt to select a unique jurisdiction as the source of the ap-
plicable regulation. Such a premise would frankly be designed to
encourage each country which might be called upon to decide the
case to make the same choice, or at least to decline to entertain the
action if the law in another country were called for and would be ap-
plied in that country to the case. Even if some countries shunned this
effort to have only one jurisdiction regulate, a missionary spirit might
still prevail; or we might at least be willing to act on such a premise
where all other countries involved in a particular transaction did like-
wise. The effect, of course, would be far more inhibiting than starting
from a premise that we should, except in the face of clear international
opposition, exert our authority over any transaction with which we
could be said to have any kind of legislative concern.
The need for unitary regulation is plainer in those areas where
the regulatory policies of various countries conflict, and yet it is
probably in those areas that there is the least hope for any kind of
international judicial or executive cooperation. On the other hand,
there may be greater cooperation in drawing jurisdictional boundaries
in areas where the public concern is of a low order and the similarity
between regulatory policies is great. If so, no single answer will satis-
factorily explain judicial practice. There may well be areas in which
the courts will search for an appropriate law rather than for an ade-
quate jurisdictional hold.
Even in a world of harmony, however, it is not clear that we
would necessarily strive for singleness of legislative jurisdiction. Dif-
ferent nations pursuing different ends according to local need may
find it necessary to regulate some elements in a complex transaction
which other nations can afford to leave uncontrolled. In such a case,
full cooperation might urge the primarily involved but less concerned
jurisdiction to yield to the one more concerned. And in areas of pub-
lic regulation, procedural difficulties might become formidable. Al-
though courts may be able to give relief in the ordinary case although
the right arises under the law of another jurisdiction, that process may
be unworkable in matters of regulation, particularly where the ex-
ercise of administrative discretion may come into play. Remission of
the offender to the country competent to legislate might often be in-
convenient, at the least. It might be impossible; inability of that
country to obtain judicial jurisdiction over the person or his property
1961]
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might leave untouched what all nations, in a spirit of full cooperation,
would prohibit.
The primary purpose of this paper is to establish that in many
areas of regulation the courts have found it necessary to consider a
great many different kinds of questions before deciding whether a
statute of the United States applies to a transaction with foreign
elements. Although an attempt is made toward the end of the paper
to generalize from the cases, and to show an organic relation between
cstatutory interpretation" and conflict-of-laws thinking, it seems neces-
sary first to establish that the simpler routes to decision are unwork-
able. Two of the most significant and obvious of the simpler ways
of deciding whether a country should regulate a particular transaction
are the location of the transaction and the personal status of the
persons involved in the transaction. The next two parts of this paper
seek to demonstrate that it has been found unworkable and irrational
to decide jurisdictional competence solely on the basis either of the
location of the activity or the status of the persons involved.
II
ACTIVITY AND THE TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE
By and large, a legislature's primary regulatory concern is with
domestic affairs. It is then perfectly appropriate, as a rule of con-
struction, to start with a presumption that legislation does not apply
extra-territorially. Care is needed, however, in the use of this pre-
sumption. It proceeds, but only in part, from the proposition that it
is uncivilized for a court to apply its local standards of conduct to
persons for some reason subject to its jurisdiction for activity carried
on at another place. If the presumption represents no more than that,
it is perfectly sound and has on occasion been articulated as a principle
of constitutional law.6 By the same token, however, the presumption
would be of relatively little utility to a judge in the ordinary case. The
difficult questions arise in the more typical case, in which some aspect
of the transaction is American, and the court must decide whether the
domestic elements in the transaction are sufficient to bring it within
the area sought to be regulated. Here it is important to be more precise
about what is meant when one says that legislation does not apply
"extra-territorially." Does the presumption operate to exclude only
those cases where neither activity nor impact occurs within the ter-
ritory, or does it assert that some, or perhaps all, activity and impact
must occur within the jurisdiction?
That there can be no single answer to this question is evident
on the simplest analysis and can be established before an examination
6 Cf. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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of the cases is undertaken. The explanation lies in part in the fact that
even in the simplest situations, it is often difficult to pinpoint the
location of activity and impact. It is probably a satisfactory conclusion
as a practical matter to say, for example, that the murder of an
American in France by a Frenchman is beyond the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States. The conclusion is, however, one which is
not a priori and which certainly requires analysis of the purpose of
the criminal legislation involved. The murder may well have a serious
impact in the United States. Would it make a difference if the French-
man was acting as the accomplice of an American in carrying out the
murder? Would it make a difference where that American accomplice
acted, or where an agreement between the American and the French-
man to commit the crime was made, or where perhaps the Frenchman's
pour boire for his part in the scheme was to be paid? Little imagination
is required in order to put cases in which it is impossible to delineate
transactions on the basis of the place where activity or impact oc-
curred.
Sometimes the factual context makes impact indistinguishable
from activity or at best no more than the logical continuation of ac-
tivity through the course at least of all its foreseeable consequences.
Perhaps because there is often no satisfactory way of deciding where
activity ends and consequence begins, the courts, as will appear, have
been surprisingly indifferent to any distinction between the two. In
fact, American rules are imposed when either activity or consequence
is abundantly present or both are fairly so. The problem before the
court, however, may be different in those cases in which the transaction
proceeds from one jurisdiction to another. Although activity within
the United States has been sufficient to make it appropriate to apply
our law when the primary impact of the activity occurred abroad, and
although we have also applied our law to activity almost wholly for-
eign which has had its impact in the United States, analytically a dif-
ference remains. Particularly when it is recognized that other factors
than activity and impact may play a role, it seems helpful to distinguish
those cases in which there is a chain of events beginning here but hav-
ing their impact abroad and those where events beginning abroad
culminate here.
Traditional notions of jurisdictional etiquette lend greater support
to the assumption of jurisdiction when activity occurs within the juris-
diction.7 In earlier days, when there may have been an attempt to
delimit transactions, to assign them to exclusive regulating jurisdic-
7 See Restatement, Foreign Relations Law § 31(1) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1958). Com-
pare the diplomatic correspondence ensuing upon the Cutting Case in 2 Moore, Int'l
Law Dig. § 201 (1906); Regina v. Martin, [1956] 2 W.L.R. 975.
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tions, and, at the same time, when there was perhaps less felt need
and less energy for the enforcement of regulations beyond geographical
boundaries, locus regit actum was a perfectly rational working prin-
ciple, both as an explanation of the assertion of jurisdiction and as
a restraint on the undue extension of jurisdiction.8 In the early ex-
tensions of legislative jurisdiction in criminal cases, consistency of
theory led the courts to declare solemnly that ships on the high seas
or even within the territorial waters of another jurisdiction were part
of the territory of the country whose flag they flew.9 Conceptual dif-
ficulties were explained on the ground that, after all, we could exercise
jurisdiction when the other sovereign had consented.'
In Branch v. FTC," our law was applied on the basis of activity
within the United States, although the brunt of the prohibited activity
was felt almost entirely abroad. Although such situations may not be
as unusual as they may have been thought to be,'2 the question remains
whether there is adequate reason today for imposing our rules of
conduct on activity occurring within the United States but having its
impact abroad. It may be that the state from which the felonious
bullet is shot has a strong interest in preventing and punishing the
very act of shooting, regardless of the location of the target. But one
would expect the state where consequences occur to have the greater
concern with economic crimes or torts not conceived to involve such
a high degree of offense to public tranquillity as an ordinary crime.
Often the evil is more the consequence of the activity than the activity
itself. If so, the interest of the state where activity occurs is quite dif-
ferent from its interest in ordinary crimes. Perhaps, where persons act
within the United States, our interest is quite simply to secure inter-
national respect for Americans, and we might fashion our rules so as
to protect persons in other countries against injury, for example, caused
by the mislabeling of goods, to the same extent that we protect people
at home.' 3 More likely, we may recognize that it is to the general in-
8 For a discussion of the influence of this notion in another context in England, see
Toetterman, "Functional Bases of the Rule Locus Regit Actunt in English Conflict Rules,"
2 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 27 (1953).
9 See Jessup, Law of Territorial Waters 133 (1927); 1 Oppenheim, International
Law §§ 172a, 264 (8th ed., Lauterpacht, 1955).
10 In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), note 54, infra; cf., United States v. Bowman,
260 U.S. 94, 99 (1922) ; Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); Vermilya-Brown
Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
11 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944).
12 E.g., Whitney, "Sources of Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust
Laws," 63 Yale L.J. 655 (1954). Cf., Thamson v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917);
Legislation, 37 Corn. L.Q. 821, 824 (1952) and cases cited.
13 Compare authorities cited in note 93, infra. For explicit advocacy of a mis-
sionary function to be played by our antitrust laws, see Timberg, "Competition-A
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terest of American exporters that all our exports are required to meet
generally recognized standards. In any event, if that interest is out-
weighed by competing foreign interests, then probably other more
specific interests of the United States would be required to control
activities here which have their impact abroad. For example, if the
impact abroad in some way filtered through to American interests, even
American interests abroad,14 a sufficient legislative concern of the
United States could be identified.
Does this concern with impact on American interests lend itself
to generalization into a concern for the way in which the foreign
market for our goods operates? Will any such concern be overcome
more easily in cases in which most of the activity occurs in a single
country than in those in which the impact is felt in several foreign
countries? Little light is shed on this question by the decided cases
and by the statutory provisions for the assertion of jurisdiction; cer-
tainly it is impossible to give any conclusive answer at this time. It
would seem fair to speculate, however, that we would feel we might
at least ordinarily defer to dissimilar foreign rules where the impact
of activity here was felt only abroad. However, if the impact were not
limited to a particular foreign country but affected American com-
merce with two foreign countries, we might be less inhibited, because
there is less reason why our law needs to defer to any other.'5 That
is to say, if acts concentrated here have diffuse consequences in sev-
eral foreign countries, the claim of a particular foreign law is dimin-
ished. Doubtless this situation is more academic than real; it would
ordinarily be difficult to identify a situation in which acts concentrated
here had no local consequences. The situation then represents a polar
case, and as soon as consequences are also identified here, the argu-
ment becomes stronger for application of our law in the face of a
claim that a foreign rule is in conflict with ours.
As consequences begin to be felt at home, we encounter the con-
verse of what has been discussed so far, for we now are dealing with
cases in which a series of events having foreign origin produces con-
sequences in this country. To those situations we now turn.
Philosophy for Export, and for Defense Production," 21 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 663, 677,
693 (1953). Compare also the Cunard case, note 68, infra; Regina v. Owen [1956] 3
W.L.R. 252.
14 E.g., Branch v. FTC, supra note 11. In a way, recognition of the appropriateness
of using the existence of injury to our nationals abroad as a guide to defining the reach
of legislation, once jurisdiction has been established on some other basis, demonstrates
the thesis of this paper. For it would generally be regarded, certainly in Anglo-American
countries, as improper to base jurisdiction solely on an injury to our nationals abroad.
See Restatement, Foreign Relations Law § 16(2) Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1953).
15 Compare, cases supra note 10.
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The nature of modern regulation leads us to assume jurisdiction
more and more often in order to regulate impact within the country.
Of course, pure cases of impact here when all the activity occurs
abroad are hard to isolate, and ordinarily there is some activity here to
support the assertion of jurisdiction. But the reason for applying our
legislation would seem more to be the effects on the United States
than the activity here. Where our concern is substantial, either the
presumption that we regulate only activity within the jurisdiction may
disappear, or the notion of activity may be extended to include its
proximate consequences. 16 The Banana case supports an argument that
so long as the acts occurred abroad the law of the United States cannot
apply.' But Mr. Justice Holmes himself cannot be held up as an
apostle of this strict view of territoriality. The complaint in American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. was not grounded on substantial im-
pact upon or injury within the United States," although the case has
of course been generally taken to stand for a strict territorial idea.
Justice Holmes, in an interstate context at least, would admit that
where there was a clear impact at home, with knowledge that the
acts abroad would take effect at home, the foreignness of the activity
would not immunize it.'9 And more recent developments indicate that
we may no longer even be concerned with intentional impact on a
particular jurisdiction. It has been said that the due process clause re-
quires that a person acting in a foreign jurisdiction have some con-
sensual connection with the jurisdiction whose law is sought to be
imposed on him;2 ° but this view may in some circumstances be too
strong,21 and modern authority suggests that objective knowledge of
possible impact upon the jurisdiction22 may be more than adequate
connection. If this authority is equally valid in the international con-
text,2 3 a foreigner who had acted abroad but knew or should have
16 See Legislation, 37 Corn. L.Q. 821, 827 (1952) ; United States v. Nord Deutscher
Lloyd, 223 U.S. 512 (1912). Compare, 49 Stat. 517 (1935), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.
(1958) (Anti-Smuggling Act), discussed in 1 Hyde, International Law § 235C (2d rev. ed.
1947). See also id., § 241.
17 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). Similar notions
still have some currency in England. Cf. Z. Cowen, "The Locus Delicti in English Private
International Law," 25 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 394 (1948).
18 See Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1452, 1455 n. 24 (1956).
19 Cf. Strasshein; v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911), discussed p. 00, infra.
20 Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934) (L. Hand, J.) (in-
ternational case) ; cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Ain., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d
Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.) (international case). See note 23, infra.
21 Cf. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933) (question left open); Fischl v. Chubb,
30 Pa. D. & C. 40 (C. P. 1937), 51 Harv. L. Rev. 738 (1938).
22 See Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws § 43f, connent h (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1956).
23 It is apparent that interstate cases making legislative jurisdictions turn on effects
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foreseen that his activity would have impact within the United States
could be held to have violated American law within accepted notions
of fairness. Knowledge of impact here, or objective ability to anticipate
the impact, would become the crucial jurisdictional factor.
Whether effects alone in the absence of knowledge or foresee-
ability should be enough is a question rarely arising.24 In many con-
texts there can be no doubt of knowledge. It seems realistic, therefore,
if not wholly defensible on theoretical grounds, to speak of the effect
or impact as the important factor,25 possibly making exception for the
rare case where the impact was caused unintentionally or involuntarily.
Certainly as a matter of statutory draftsmanship, it may be preferable
to speak only of the prohibited effect rather than to attempt to define
in addition, as a part of the jurisdictional hold that needs to be
established affirmatively, the necessary "intent."2
There seems to be no reason to feel any jurisdictional inhibition
within the state are not necessarily apposite in the international context. See Whitney,
"Sources of Conflict between International Law and the Anti-trust Laws," 63 Yale LJ.
655, 660-62 (1954). There is reason for presuming greater similarity between the
laws of the different states than between the laws of different nations, because of com-
mon tradition and such unity as a federal system engenders. If the jurisdictional
issue is to be resolved on the basis of some such normative presumption, one could
suggest as bearing on that issue that in interstate cases it is less likely that the rules
will vary as much, if at all, from state to state as they will from nation to nation.
Perhaps as a corollary, the likelihood of conflict and offense is less in interstate cases.
These considerations, however, cut both ways; although extraterritoriality is less of a
problem in terms of offense and conflict in interstate cases, at the same time less is lost
by imposing more rigid limitations on the extraterritorial reach of state legislation.
Unless more is known about the particular case, the arguments may produce a stand-
off. If, however, the jurisdictional rule is allowed to vary according to the relevance
in a particular context of such factors as are elaborated in Part IV the distinctions
between the interstate and the international context may often suggest rational dif-
ferentiation; they may well be relevant in weighing such factors as the degree of con-
flict, the likelihood of offense, the importance of the interest asserted by the regulating
state and the importance of the interest affected in the second state. It is difficult to
identify distinctions between the interstate and international context which are im-
portant apart from their influence on the judgments made about these kinds of
factors, and the courts in any event are likely to use the cases interchangeably in
their consideration of individual factors.
24 It is discussed in Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws § 43f, comment h (Tent.
Draft No. 3 1956).
25 Cf. Kronstein, "The Nationality of International Enterprises," 52 Col. L. Rev.
983, 998 (1952).
26 E.g., 40 Stat. 517 (1918), 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1958) (excepting from Webb-Pomerene
exemption agreements or acts "either in the United States or elsewhere" which have
defined effects on prices or competition within the United States); 40 Stat. 517 (1918),
15 U.S.C. § 63 (1958) (similar exception for mergers). Compare, Restatement, Foreign
Relations Law § 8(c) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1958); id., § 31, Reporter's Note on Com-
ment b.
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against using the power to exclude or seize as a penalty for activity
abroad which we deem unlawful." Application of our law in this way
may well influence events occurring considerably beforehand and in
other places. The question may be simply whether we feel so strongly
that we are willing to pay the price of foreign resentment. It may be
argued that the law of the United States does not "begin to apply"
until the goods are introduced into the country itself, but this argu-
ment is often quite unreal. 28
A celebrated instance of definition of importation appears in the
Prohibition Act case of Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon,29 which ultimately
had to be overcome by treaty arrangements with each of several
European countries. The Court there upheld regulations designed to
prevent the bringing of alcoholic beverages into our territorial waters
in the ship's stores of foreign ships even though these stores were
immediately sealed off by customs officials for the duration of the
stay in port.30 The Court said that "importation" was not limited to
actual entry through the customhouse but included any bringing of
such items into "regional areas"-land or adjacent waters--over
which the United States claimed and exercised control as a sovereign
power.31 The Court accepted the claim that an exception to the
Volstead Act for foreign ships would tend to embarrass enforcement
of the Eighteenth Amendment and defeat attainment of its obvious
purpose. The danger of impact upon the United States was sufficient
to overcome the foreign "territoriality" of the ship and was clearly
considered more relevant than the activity here as a basis for applying
our law to foreign ships in our territorial waters.32
In Ford v. United States,3 3 the Court had to deal with the treaty
27 E.g., United States v. 25 Packages of Panama Hats, 231 U.S. 358 (1913) (the
Court made it plain, however, that the actor could not himself be punished for the
fraudulent activity involved).
28 There are situations in which we-perhaps more as a matter of policy-make
sharp distinctions near the water's edge. Procedure under the Food and Drug Act at
one time allowed imports not yet released from customs to be reexported if they were
adulterated. Once released from customs, the food would be subject to seizure as if it
were food originating in interstate commerce, despite the fact that it was still in the
original package and had been adulterated on arrival. See 230 Boxes, More or Less, of
Fish v. United States, 168 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v. 500 Bags, More
or Less, of Green Coffee, 97 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. La. 1951).
29 262 U.S. 100 (1923). For a full discussion of this case and the cases interpreting
the treaties entered into, see 1 Hyde, International Law §§ 235A, 235B (2d rev. ed 1947).
30 Compare, p. 00, infra.
31 The Eighteenth Amendment applied to "the manufacture, sale, or transportation
of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof
from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof."
32 See also Jessup, Law of Territorial Waters 191 (1927).
33 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
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made between the United States and Great Britain in order to meet
the obvious international embarrassment which the Cunard decision
produced. In return for an exemption of ships' stores on British ships,
a treaty with Great Britain had authorized the seizure and prosecution
of persons importing liquor into the United States and the seizure in
this connection of ships within one hour's run of the United States.
The Ford case upheld a conviction of defendants prosecuted for con-
spiring to violate the Prohibition Act who remained outside the "juris-
diction" of the United States at all times. There were accomplices on
shore, and in fact three actual landings had been effected before the
defendants were apprehended. But the Court seemed to place little
emphasis on the location of the physical activity; the effect of the
whole enterprise was enough: "[t]he conspiring was directed to viola-
tion of the United States law within the United States, by men within
and without it, and everything done was at the procuration and by
the agency of each for the other in pursuance of the conspiracy and
the intended illegal importation. In such a case all are guilty of the
offense of conspiring to violate the United States law whether they are
in or out of the country."34
Thus, even in the liquor cases, where strong territorial notions
were invoked both as to domestic and as to foreign ships in the Cunard
case, jurisdiction may have been based primarily on an impact within
the United States. Somewhat as in Blackmer v. United States,35 where
prior activity in the United States could have been found to support
the assertion of jurisdiction, the Court in the Ford case might have
limited itself to acts done, although in part by agents, within the coun-
try. But the Court relied also on Strassheim v. Daily,36 where Daily
was charged with defrauding the state of Michigan. On habeas corpus
from arrest under a warrant directing Daily's extradition to Michigan,
Daily resisted extradition on the ground that he was not in Michigan
on the dates on which the crimes were alleged to have been committed
and was therefore not a fugitive from justice. The Court assumed that
it would have been enough if the acts done outside Michigan were in-
tended to produce and did produce detrimental effects within it. The
facts of the case would have permitted a narrower holding; Daily did
appear in Michigan at times close to the dates when the acts were
alleged to have occurred and was in league with a person acting in
Michigan. But Justice Holmes seems to have put the decision in part
on the broader ground and so indicated in his opinion in a later case. 37
"[T] he usage of the civilized world would warrant Michigan in punish-
34 Id. at 620.
35 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
30 221 U.S. 280 (1911) (Holmes, J.).
37 See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 384, 386 (1911) (dissenting opinion).
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ing him, although he never had set foot in the State until after the
fraud was complete."38
Little in Strassheim v. Daily suggests that reliance was placed on
the fact that it was the state of Michigan itself which was affected.
Justice Holmes makes no distinction which would suggest a different
result in a case of fraud on an individual.39 But normally the reach
of the law will depend on the directness of the harm to the government
itself. In United States v. Bowman,4 where a defendant was
indicted for conspiracy to defraud a corporation-here the Shipping
Board-in which the United States was a stockholder, Chief Justice
Taft relied heavily on the fact that it was a crime against the govern-
ment rather than one simply affecting private interests. He took it
for granted that crimes against individuals had to be committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the government concerned, unless Con-
gress explicitly said that the crime had a wider jurisdictional reach.
"We have an example of this in the attempted application of the
prohibition of the antitrust law to acts done by citizens of the United
States against other such citizens in a foreign country. ' 41 The Banana
case, he said, was a civil case, but as the statute was criminal as well
as civil, it presented an analogy. On the other hand, some statutes do
not depend on locality for jurisdiction; the statute here was designed
to defend the government against obstruction or fraud, and limiting
the locus of the crime to the territorial jurisdiction would greatly
curtail the scope of the crime and leave open a large immunity for
frauds.4 ' The jurisdictional reach is to be inferred from the nature of
the offense.43 For example, an American consul knowingly certifying
a false invoice commits a crime within the jurisdictional reach of the
statute, although the crime would necessarily have its locus abroad.
38 221 U.S., at 284-85. Compare, 40 Stat. 230 (1940) (prohibited use of U.S. mails
by unregistered foreign propagandists; provision construed to be applicable to persons
outside United States, 39 Op. Att'y 535 (1940)), with 41 Stat. 313 (1919) (prohibi-
tion against advertisements of liquor was not applicable to "newspapers published in
foreign countries when mailed to this country").
39 Compare the reference of justice Brandeis to the power of the State to protect
itself and its inhabitants in Young v. Masci, supra note 21.
40 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
41 260 U.S. at 98.
42 Cf. United States v. Archer, 12 F.2d 137 (S.D. Ala. 1926), where there was held
to be no violation of the Volstead Act in activity 24 miles out, because the Cunard case
said that the Volstead Act did not extend more than a marine league beyond the coast.
In the course of the opinion, it was said that as there was no charge that the United
States had been defrauded in any way, the case was distinguishable from the Bowman
case.
43 For an apparently comparable French decision, see DeLaume, "Jurisdiction over
Crimes Committed Abroad: French and American Law," 21 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 173,
183 note 35 (1952).
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Likewise, desertions from the naval service or thefts of government
property were crimes which could easily occur abroad, and the statutes
should be construed to extend that far. Whichever of the many distinc-
tions Chief Justice Taft makes is accepted, it seems plain that the
decision in that case is correct. Its strongest basis, one would think,
is the wide possibility of evasion which any other construction would
permit.4 4 That, coupled with the importance to the government that
it protect itself against harmful effects wherever set in motion,4 5 seems
more than adequate basis for the conclusion which he reached.
Bowman cannot, however, be taken simply as an example of
the kind of obstruction of the government involved, for example, in
treason cases. On the facts of the case, involving losses by a separate
corporation in which the government owned stock, it would have been
difficult to assimilate the case to ones in which the safety of the state
was endangered. The Court properly relates the public importance of
the crime to the problem of how explicitly the extraterritorial reach
of a crime must be stated, and observes, it would seem properly, that
in the absence of other indicia of Congressional intent, a statute in-
volving crimes against individuals without public overtones will be
read as being limited in its jurisdictional reach.
In conclusion, it seems that in clearly private matters such as
simple torts, there is a strong presumption of jurisdictional inhibition
which ordinarily limits the application of law to relevant events oc-
curring within the territory. This inhibition has expressed itself vari-
ously as the consequence of the due process clause, of analysis running
in terms of sovereign power, or of the fair and appropriate division
of legislative competence among different jurisdictions. Indeed, it
underlies much of the thinking in the treatment of torts in the con-
flict of laws, where judicially developed divisions of competence have
roots in the related problems of the division of competence among dif-
ferent jurisdictions to try crimes, and among courts of the same
jurisdiction to adjudicate different kinds of disputes, the context in
which choice-of-law thinking began in English law.
46
With the increasing scope of public regulation, it was natural and
necessary that the division of competence among different states be-
44 See Part IV, infra.
45 Compare 1 Hyde, International Law § 241 (2d rev. ed. 1947), finding justifica-
tion for prosecution of an alien "when the act of the individual is one which the law
of nations itself renders internationally illegal or regards as one which any member
of the international society is free to oppose and thwart" or "when the act complained
of is to be fairly regarded as directed against the safety of the prosecuting state." See
also id., § 242.
46 See Sack, Conflict of Laws in the History of English Law, 3 Law: A Century
of Progress, 1835-1935 342 (1937).
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come a matter of increasing concern. The broad language of regulatory
legislation was presumed to contain jurisdictional limitations, for the
legislation of a single country cannot bind the world. This was par-
ticularly true where the legislative policy of different nations was in
conflict, but was a strongly felt need even when it was the same. With
simple crimes condemned by all, it was still thought that prosecution
ought to occur where the crime had occurred, and an exception for
piracy was truly an exception, based both on the notion that the
courts of all nations had equal competence over the high seas and on
the expedience of prosecution wherever a pirate could be found.
If crime was to be prosecuted only where it occurred, some method
of defining the locus of crime had to be devised, and the territorial
limits of a jurisdiction naturally suggested themselves as the appro-
priate limitation to the Anglo-American courts. Continental jurisdic-
tions, which put greater emphasis on a person's nationality than on
the location of his activity, were willing to prosecute their citizens for
crimes committed abroad. Such a difference in approach remains, and
although it suggests that there may be little international consensus
on the appropriate method for delimiting jurisdictional competence,
it suggests also that Anglo-American traditions require some territorial
connections.
In Anglo-American law, territoriality has become one of the most
significant canons of interpretation of legislation which does not con-
tain express jurisdictional limitations. Territoriality, however, some-
times fails to achieve the appropriate balance between the statutory
purpose and international responsibility. In much the same way that
the conflict of laws has grown out of problems of competing judicial
jurisdiction, there may be emerging a kind of conflicts thinking for
the division of legislative competence in matters of economic regula-
tion. Although the courts recognize that it will not do to have several
nations imposing inconsistent obligations, they also find, at the same
time, that it will not do to deny legislative competence to a jurisdiction
which has a strong reason for preventing evils properly of concern
to it solely on the basis of a geographical principle calling for use of a
test, often uncertain in its application, that the offense be committed
"within" the territory of the regulating jurisdiction. Certainly it is
less than clear how to proceed when there is activity and impact in
more than one jurisdiction, and although territoriality must remain a
natural canon of construction, it is bound to yield to more realistic
considerations as situations require, whether those considerations lead
to jurisdictional expansion or to greater inhibition than the territoriality
test would produce.
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III
STATUS: NATIONALITY AND RESIDENCE
It is difficult to say exactly what weight will be given to personal
status as a jurisdictional factor, especially when it does not coincide
with the activity connected with a transaction. But it is perfectly
clear that personal status is a significant factor. Whichever of the
various indicia of personal status-nationality, domicile or residence-
is most important is also difficult to say, because of the various sources
of law drawn on to determine jurisdictional propriety. While inter-
national law and continental European conflict-of-laws sources give
perhaps greater weight to nationality, Anglo-American conflict of laws
and rules of subject-matter jurisdiction support greater emphasis on
domicile and residence. And the tests of domicile, but even more so of
residence, are coming increasingly to depend on a permanence of
headquarters defined in terms of a persistence or continuance of ac-
tivity. Thus, the Anglo-American tests of status often draw heavily
on the pattern of activity of the person or legal entity involved, so
that although it may not be strictly relevant to a status test to con-
sider the particular activities sought to be regulated the test is never-
theless a kind of test of activity rather than of status in any pure
sense in many instances.
At the same time, when a judge faces the decision whether to
extend the application of our law to foreigners, he cannot help con-
sidering, in the case of foreigners whose legal institutions work out
such problems in terms of nationality, the fact that it may seem both
unfair and improper to them and their countries to apply our law on
the basis of a notion of personal status which prevails in the United
States. There is then the possibility, which is perhaps reflected by the
cases, that although we may not regard it as appropriate to extend
our law to our nationals whose activities are carried on entirely abroad,
the converse may not hold completely. Because of the greater emphasis
in international law and continental conflict of laws on nationality,
activity here which we would otherwise punish may well be left un-
controlled when the actor is a national of a foreign country. It is
important to keep this distinction, which will be elaborated in the
context of particular cases, firmly in mind. The significant point, so
far as American jurisdictional practice is concerned, is that nationality
may in effect work as a negative factor, limiting the application of
our law to foreigners although not justifying the application of our law
to our own nationals.
As the foregoing suggests, nationality is much less often relied
upon as a basis of jurisdiction in common law countries than in civil
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law jurisdictions,47 so that relatively few prohibitions against conduct
extend only to nationals," and the cases make it doubtful that na-
tionality is ordinarily considered a sufficient basis for regulating con-
duct when no additional jurisdictional hold is present. "Pure" cases
of subjection to the laws of the United States on the basis of a personal
relation occur, for example, in taxation,49 but with laws regulating
conduct, such cases are hard to isolate where no impact on the United
States is shown. Indeed, it is hard for an Anglo-American lawyer to
conceive of situations requiring application of our law to a national
who, entirely apart from commerce between the United States and
the foreign country in which he for the moment is transacting business
and entirely apart from any effect upon or activity within the United
States, acts in a way which, if he acted in the United States, would
violate our law. Our courts quite naturally, then, assume the attitude
that "the legislation of the Congress, unless the contrary intent ap-
pears, is construed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States."50 In practice the only significant question is
whether it makes any difference, in determining whether there is a
"contrary intent," that the conduct sought to be regulated is engaged
in by a national or resident of the United States.
Often the ostensible reason for holding citizens to a higher stand-
ard is a desire to protect some American interest, even if it is simply
the private interest of other American citizens. This seems the simplest
basis for the result in a case like Branch v. FTC.5 That case upheld
an FTC order against an American citizen to cease and desist from
methods of unfair competition in conducting correspondence courses
in Latin America. Although there were some activities in the United
States in furtherance of the deception of persons in Latin America,
the court's willingness to apply our law stemmed not so much from
the activities within the United States as from the fact that there were
American competitors of the petitioner who were operating also in
Latin America. The Banana case52 was distinguished as one in which
47 See Restatement, Foreign Relations Law § 31(2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1958);
cf. Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 57 note 11 (2d ed. 1951); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
195 (3d ed. 1949).
48 Statutes regulating conduct in commerce quite generally apply to "any person"
rather than exclusively to citizens. See, e.g., 54 Stat. 1129 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 68a (1958)
(labeling of wool products); and statutes cited in this part.
49 E.g., Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924); see Barlow and Wender, Foreign In-
vestment and Taxation 231 et seq. (1955); Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws
§ 43f(1) (c) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956) ; id., comment f, illustration 3; id., comment h.
50 Blackner v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
51 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944).
52 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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there was "not an attempt to protect resident competitors from the
defilement of commerce originating in the United States." 53
It should perhaps be said, incidentally, that there is considerable
language in the cases which attempts a different justification of the use
of nationality as an independent basis for the application of our law
to citizens but not to aliens engaged in the same activities. The notion
is one of recompense to the government for the protection it affords to
citizens. Subjection of individuals to the jurisdiction of consular courts
abroad has been explicitly supported by this notion of allegiance as a
two-way street 4 Explicit statutory limitation of privileges and other
advantages to citizens of the United States is frequent. Apart from
obvious governmental protections at home and abroad, there is a sur-
prising number of situations in which we require that certain kinds of
actually or notionally sensitive operations-for example, sailing in
coast-wise trade, radio broadcasting and ownership of public utilities
-be carried on by Americans or by companies almost wholly owned
by AmericansY Such measures discriminating in favor of citizens may
derive simply from provincialist inclinations but often reflect an un-
derstandable feeling that some American interests can best be served
by keeping certain activities in American hands. It would, in any
event, not be wholly unreal to justify holding citizens to a higher stand-
ard of amenability to our laws as a kind of quid pro quo for govern-
mental favors. Nevertheless, another explanation seems adequately to
explain the cases, and that is simply that in some cases, such as the
Branch case, the fact of citizenship is relevant to the particular regula-
tion involved. This part, then, will seek to demonstrate that in many
cases where citizenship has seemed to play a positive role, it does so
because there is some functional relationship between the fact of
citizenship and the kind of obligation sought to be imposed, and that
where this is not so, the fact that the actor is an American citizen
means simply that there can be no supervening objection to the
assertion of a jurisdictional hold established on some other basis such
as activity.
There are cases, now almost of Hornbook status, which are taken
53 141 F.2d, at p. 35. It should he noted that there was no argument that the law
in Latin America was in conflict with our law. See discussion in Part IV, infra.
54 See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), where a sailor on an American ship was
convicted in an American consular tribunal in Japan for a murder committed on board
the ship in the harbor of Yokohama. Even the sailor's claim of British citizenship was
not enough to defeat the jurisdiction of the consular court. Cf. 1 Hyde, International
Law § 240 (2d rev. ed. 1947). As a sailor on an American ship, he was entitled to every-
thing an American-born seaman would be, and for that reason owed a temporary al-
legiance sufficient to justify our assertion of jurisdiction.
55 Several examples, including the ownership of radio licenses and the beneficiaries
of various financial and other privileges, are given in BREWSTER, page 328 n.55.
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to establish a proposition that American law can be applied to a trans-
action solely because an American citizen is involved. The case most
commonly cited to demonstrate the broad power of the state over the
citizen, Blackmer v. United States,56 poses a curious interfusion 7 of
questions of judicial and legislative jurisdiction. In holding that it
was proper to find Blackmer guilty of contempt of an American court
for failing to respond to subpoenas served on him in France, the court
does indeed say that citizen Blackmer was bound by the law of the
United States. Blackmer's prior activity in the United States, although
that might well have been sufficient to uphold legislative jurisdiction,
is ignored, and his citizenship is said to be the basis of decision. The
true question in the case concerned the propriety of the statutory
method of obtaining personal or judicial jurisdiction; the objections
raised by Blackmer, as recited by Chief Justice Hughes in the opinion,
look more to the question of personal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the
question of legislative authority was involved and was resolved on the
basis of citizenship. But the question of establishing a hold on a citizen
for purposes of compelling testimony is quite different from that of
regulating the citizen's conduct. The duty to testify is at least as much
a responsibility of citizenship or residence as it is an obligation arising
out of the doing of an act; it certainly was so conceived in the Black-
mer case, and Congress, in many regulatory statutes applying to com-
merce, has dealt separately with the jurisdictional reach of the court
in requiring the attendance of witnesses and the production of docu-
ments."8
Another case accompanying the Blackmer case in the citations,
that of Skiriotes v. Florida,59 is more relevant to the question of the
power to regulate conduct. There the Supreme Court upheld the con-
viction of a resident of Florida for violation of a Florida statute regu-
lating the method of taking commercial sponges from waters claimed
by Florida but alleged to be outside the territorial waters of the United
States. Once the Court determined that the Florida regulation did not
56 284 U.S. 421 (1932). There is authority to the effect that the case stands for
the broad proposition that nationality is an appropriate basis for applying rules of
conduct. See Restatement, Foreign Relations Law § 16, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1958).
57 Compare, Restatement, Conffict of Laws § 63, illustration 3 (1934); with id.
§ 80, comment c.
58 See, e.g., 49 Stat. 831 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79r (1958) (PUHCA of 1935); 54
Stat. 842 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41 (1958) (Investment Company Act of 1940), both
providing that in defined circumstances, "attendance of witnesses and the production of
any (specified] documents may be required from any place in any State or in any
Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. . . ." Cf.
SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, SA., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945).
59 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
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conflict with federal interests, it seemed almost willing to equate the
position of Florida as against the world with the international position
of the United States. But the Court was careful to draw an analogy
rather than to strike an equation. Although in its early discussion of the
regulatory power of the United States, the Court spoke not only of
the high seas but also of foreign countries, it spoke only of the high
seas when discussing the State's power to regulate its citizens.10 The
case remains of interest because of its emphasis on citizenship, but
apart from the federal issues involved, it seems quite in line with
many decisions asserting jurisdiction beyond the territorial waters to
protect the regulating jurisdiction or, often, to fill a void in places
where no government exists. To such decisions we now turn.
Crimes committed aboard ships belonging to United States citi-
zens have been subjected to our criminal jurisdiction,"' even when a
ship on a river, 250 miles inland from the sea, was physically attached
to the shore of another jurisdiction."' When, however, the crime is
subject to punishment by two jurisdictions, we would ordinarily limit
ourselves to cases where there was no conflict between the law of the
jurisdiction in which the acts occurred and the law of the United
States; in cases of conflict, the local authority would usually prevail
in the absence of treaty. 3 In Wildenhus's Case,64 the United States, on
the ground that the public tranquillity of the port was involved, did
subject to criminal punishment in our courts a Belgian committing
murder on a Belgian vessel in one of our ports. The authorities in
criminal cases do not seem to establish that we will assert our juris-
diction over crimes committed within the territory of another state by
our citizens, or by aliens who become our concern because they sail
aboard American ships, if application of our law is offensive to the
foreign jurisdiction. 65 They seem rather to say that, as a matter of
GO Compare id., at pp. 73, 74, with id., at pp. 77-79 passim. See note 65, infra.
That state citizenship is based on residence would not seem to deny the possibility that
a distinction of this sort e'ists. But cf. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 47, comment c
(1934); and compare, Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws § 43f, comment f (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1956). At the least, of course, the state would have to yield to *the federal
government in matters of federal concern, as the Court recognized in the Skiriotes case.
61 See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), discussed supra note 54.
62 United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933).
03 See id. at 158-59; Jessup, Law of Territorial Waters 179-94 (1927) passim;
cf. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 63 (1934); Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
04 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
05 Compare the language in Skiriotes v. Florida, at 73, where Chief Justice Hughes,
in speaking of "domestic rights and duties," as distinguished from "international rights
and duties" as exemplified in the Volstead Act case of Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, note
68, infra, said, "... the United States is not debarred by any rule of international law
from governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign
countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed."
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convenience, there may well be concurrent jurisdiction in cases in-
volving crime aboard ship within the territorial waters of a foreign
country so that the country whose flag the ship flies may also punish,
unless the local authorities choose to assert their own power. At best,
then, they represent an extension of the cases of crimes committed
on the high seas to a convenient line of demarcation, with the consent
of the foreign sovereign,66 rather than instances in which our law
may be said to operate on any logical premise within the jurisdiction of
another country.6 7
In another area where the public significance of the regulation
may well have been thought to be comparable with that of crime, we
have been more expressly inhibited about applying our law to our
citizens beyond the territorial confines of the country. When the At-
torney General advised the President of the United States that the
Volstead Act prohibited American ships from having liquor on board
any place in the world, the Supreme Court disagreed and enjoined
enforcement of regulations designed to prohibit the carrying of liquor
on American ships in places outside the territorial waters of the
United States08 Perhaps in the liquor cases, the interest of the United
States was directed more to prohibiting certain activity within the
United States than to holding Americans up to an American standard
of sobriety regardless of where they were. 9
The jurisdictional reach of our law to citizens may grow accord-
ing to the seriousness of the impact upon the United States70 and the
immediacy of that effect on the government itself. Treasonous acts
committed wholly in a foreign jurisdiction are punishable by the United
States.71 But there are other instances of the importance of particular
legislation to the government which do not seem to be on quite the
same plane as national security and the currency and yet which call
for higher standards of conduct from citizens. To invert Holmes's
66 Compare supra note 10. Accord, Jessup, Law of Territorial Waters 191-192
(1927).
67 Compare, 46 Stat. 1005 (1930), 22 U.S.C. § 270 (1958).
68 Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1932). The Court's decision in this
case that the regulations could prohibit liquor from being brought into our ports by
foreign ships has been discussed. See also supra note 10.
69 The treaties entered into with various nations in order to overcome the impact
of the Cunard decision as it affected foreign ships did, indeed, at the same time permit
some seizures beyond the territorial waters, but for violations occurring within the
United States, see infra.
70 National security and fiscal necessity have been suggested as the reason for
unveiling the real interests behind corporations formally incorporated elsewhere. See
Kronstein, "The Nationality of International Enterprise," 52 Col. L. Rev. 983 (1952).
71 Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 733 (1952) (affirming a conviction of
a person with dual citizenship for treason).
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phrase, it has surprised the courts to hear it argued that acts of in-
fidelity to the sovereign, not involving the security of the state, are
immune because the acts occurred entirely outside the territorial con-
fines of the United States.72 The Neutrality Law prior to World War
II may be an example of legislation of this order of public importance;
United States citizens were not allowed to travel on ships of countries
named in neutrality proclamations.7"
A quite different kind of case is that in which private remedies
are involved.74 Particularly well litigated have been the Jones Act
remedies for seamen. The Jones Act has been applied to seamen, re-
gardless of the registry of the ship, where the ship was owned by
United States citizens. As a matter of choice of law, this result does
not seem out of line. It has familiar analogies in ordinary conflict-of-
laws cases. The argument is that remedies of the seaman against the
owner ought to be defined by the law common, and for that reason
supposedly familiar to both of them. In Gerradin v. United Fruit
Corp.,70 where the Jones Act was applied apparently on this basis,
there is an element of evasion of our laws which may be thought to
color the court's opinion. Adverting specifically to the argument that
Congress has the power to impose liability upon citizens for acts done
on the high seas or at other places outside our territorial jurisdiction,
the court was somewhat troubled by the foreign registry of the ship,
but met it with the fact that the ship was owned by one United States
citizen and operated by another United States citizen. As the court
said, it "seems but a slight disregard of the symbol of foreign registry
to apply an ordinary rule of torts to a shipowner who bears such an
illusory shield.' 76
The element of citizenship may also be relevant, if the seaman
is an American, although he is for the moment working on a foreign
ship. In Uravic v. F. Jarka Co.,77 Justice Holmes wrote for the Court
in holding the Jones Act applicable to a stevedore killed while un-
72 Compare United States v. Bowman, (citizen convicted of defrauding corporation
which United States owned), supra p. 23; with United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp.
708 (S.D. Cal. 1943) (alien convicted of perjury before United States consul abroad;
the consulate was deemed United States territory); United States v. Palmer, 67 F.2d
146 (7th Cir. 1933). But cf., United States v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
(granting motion to dismiss indictment of alien for giving false information to im-
migration authorities).
73 54 Stat. 7 (1939), 22 U.S.C. § 445 (1958).
74 A number of cases involve American areas overseas. See, e.g., Green, Ap-
plicability of American Laws to Overseas Areas Controlled by the United States,
68 Harv. L. Rev. 781 (1955).
75 60 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1932).
76 Evasion will be discussed in Part IV, infra.
77 282 U.S. 234 (1931).
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loading a German ship in the port of New York. Some interpretational
difficulty was involved, since the Jones Act applies only to a "seaman."
A seaman aboard a German ship, whether a German citizen either in
fact, or perhaps simply by the notional allegiance of the seaman to the
flag of the ship on which he is sailing,"8 would not have been entitled
to the benefits of the Jones Act. But Justice Holmes said that it
would be surprising if a stevedore's benefits should depend on the flag
of the ship which he was unloading.79 There can be little doubt that
Justice Holmes was influenced by the activities within the United
States. He said, "The conduct regulated is of universal concern. The
rights of a citizen within the territorial limits of the country are more
extensively determined by the scope of actions for torts than even by
the law of crimes." Perhaps, then, Justice Holmes is saying that this
was not a case of internal discipline and private matters of the ship,
even if, apparently, it might have been for purposes of criminal juris-
diction. He does seem to imply that because the matter is of universal
concern, the likelihood of affront to the foreign country may be less.
And although citizenship was a crucial factor in the decision, the
jurisdictional hold on the defendant seems to have been activity within
the United States.
Even in the few cases, then, in which the exercise of jurisdiction
is influenced by citizenship, there are gradations in the extent to which
American law is applied. The public importance of the particular regu-
lation, the impact on private or public persons within the United
States, the relative significance of the activity within the United States,
and the extent to which there is a conflict with foreign law, all play
their role along with the relevance of the fact of citizenship in ascer-
taining whether the territorial presumption is overcome by a contrary
intent. In some cases the regulation is directly related to citizenship,
as with taxes and treason and the Blackmer situation. Where this is
not so, citizenship plays a subordinate role to territoriality, and it is
impossible to assert that there is any straightforward rule about the
extent to which our regulation is applied to citizens or, as in some
Jones Act cases, in favor of citizens. Even in this subsidiary role, the
importance of citizenship seems to vary with the particular legislation
involved and the problems which that legislation is attempting to meet.
In particular, unless some governmental purpose is involved which
can fairly call upon citizens for a different standard of conduct than
from others, the role of citizenship ordinarily seems to be, and proper-
ly so, a negative factor in the assertion of jurisdiction.
78 Compare In re Ross, supra note 54.
79 Compare, Strathearn S. S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920), applying the half-
wages provisions of the Seaman's Act of 1915, 38 Stat. 1164 (1915), in favor of a
British subject on board a British vessel in an American port.
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IV
A CHOICE-OF-LAW APPROACH
The last two parts have demonstrated the difficulty of dealing
with territoriality or status as the sole jurisdictional test. The problems
are so varied that the question of regulation or non-regulation by the
United States cannot be resolved simply on the basis of the location
of the activity or the status of the actors. And for this reason a judge
attempting by "interpretation" to find an undisclosed legislative defini-
tion of the scope of application of a statute will often find it difficult
to conclude that Congress could have wanted the result which would
be produced by simple application of a territoriality or status test.
Dealing commonsensically with a problem which Congress neither
faced nor could be expected in many situations to face intelligently,
the judge must conclude that the legislature has not in fact exercised
what would be its very proper function of drawing arbitrary lines
and declaring irrelevant a number of factors which would otherwise
appeal to the judge as being quite relevant. However students of legal
institutions might choose to characterize the division of the law-making
function between the legislature and the judge here, it seems plain at
the least that a judge is ordinarily justified in feeling relatively free to
consider and to weigh all relevant factors.
How does the judge proceed? Ideally, an analysis of the cases
would at this point proceed to formulate working principles for the
judge. It would first recognize that among the factors a judge would
examine are the kind of regulation involved, the importance of that
regulation to the government, the policy and law of other jurisdic-
tions involved, and the relative significance to the various jurisdictions
of their regulation, as well as the degree to which various elements in
the transaction are located or related to the various jurisdictions. This
much it seems possible to do. The analysis would then go further and,
after intensive analysis of a large number of complicated areas of
substantive law, attempt to state what relative weight is to be given
these various factors. Such an analysis, however, would probably no
longer reflect what courts have done, for courts proceed to judgment
without making the fine discriminations which that analysis would
require. Acting as they do on those analogies familiar to them, drawn
from international law precedents, from choice-of-law principles, or
from notions of subject-matter jurisdictional proprieties or more simple
notions of power and offense, individual judges respond differently.
Certainly few judges have attempted to assign priorities among these
various sources of law, and of course these sources are such that even
if a judge were to rely heavily on one as against others, he would
be unlikely to find those definitive answers which he might like. Little
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more need be said than to refer to the Supreme Court's opinion in
Lauritzen v. Larsen, where all of these sources and their rules are con-
sidered relevant. And, further, many cases, like Lauritzen v. Larsen
itself, can be decided without making the fine discriminations which
might theoretically seem necessary. Certainly when a great number
of considerations point in one direction whether one looks to inter-
national law, conflict of laws, or subject-matter jurisdiction, it is quite
unnecessary for a judge, and indeed in such a complicated and develop-
ing area of the law it can be argued that it would be improper for
the judge, to decide more than what is sufficient to dispose of the case
before him.
For these reasons, an analysis of the cases remains analysis and
does not become prophecy if it is limited to description of the situa-
tions in which various factors seem properly to have been considered
relevant. The purpose of this part, then, is to analyze the various
factors in addition to activity and status which are relevant in deter-
mining whether a statute does apply "abroad." As already stated, no
attempt will be made to assign relative priorities among these factors.
The purpose of this part is simply to show that often a case cannot
rationally be decided without consideration of these factors and to
suggest, without attempting to decide what happens when the factors
point in different directions, that concurrence of a number of such
factors is sufficient for a judge to dispose of the case, when applica-
tion of a simple activity or status test would either leave him in doubt
or perhaps point in a somewhat different direction.
In addition to the kinds of secondary factors already described,
this part will also consider briefly two other notions that seem to crop
up from time to time, and which have analogies in international law
and conflict of laws. They are evasion of the law and reciprocity.
Evasion will be discussed immediately; reciprocity will be discussed
as one of the problems, which will be considered generally in this part,
of the appropriate degree of deference to be given foreign law and
policy.
a) "Evasion"-To the extent that some elements in a transaction
are capable of being "located" in a jurisdiction with favorable regula-
tion or no regulation, a judge may on occasion be confronted with a
case in which he feels that the transaction has been designed to evade
regulation. Ideally, jurisdictional rules, whether defined explicitly by
the legislature or developed by judicial construction, would be suf-
ficiently flexible so that very few cases of attempted evasion would
occur. But useful crystallization of principle into rules with sufficient
specificity to furnish the guidance which the law ought to give invites
shifting of non-essential elements in a transaction for the purpose of
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putting the transaction outside the crystallized rule while leaving the
essential nature of the transaction unchanged. For example, it may
be a trademark infringement not only to sell a product with an in-
fringing trademark in a jurisdiction where another has registered that
trademark but also simply to affix the trademark in that jurisdiction,
although sales are made abroad where the trademark is not registered.
If A affixes B's valid U. S. trademark in the United States to an
American product to be sold abroad where B has not registered the
trademark, the act of affixing the trademark would nonetheless be a
violation of our law. To what extent would A stand to gain by affixing
the trademark after the product has left the United States? The an-
swer, of course, is not as easy as it may seem. One solution is to say
simply that if the place where sales occur or the trademark is affixed
give B's trademark no protection, that is the end of it. The court
would simply dismiss the case and remit B to the other country, where
he may be able to establish a case at least in unfair competition. But
if the other country would in fact grant a remedy, although on a dif-
ferent theory, it may be difficult for a judge to see why he must accept
that solution rather than grant a remedy here. 0
It is easy enough to recognize that there is always a danger that
foreign elements in a case are fabrications by a suspecting victim of
regulation rather than bona fide foreign connections. It is far more
difficult to formulate any rules for testing whether a particular case
is one of evasion. Any fair test necessarily throws the court into a
rather uncomfortable role in which good faith and motivation become
important. Although it can be said that if there is no normal or sen-
sible reason for part of the transaction to occur outside of the United
States, a judge can with some confidence proceed to find evasion.,' It
will almost always be difficult to say what is normal or sensible, or
what is the direct purpose, in the typical case where many business
and legal considerations have gone into the styling of the arrangement.
It is perhaps for this reason that the United States, perhaps less than
other countries, has not often relied, at least expressly, on the notion
of evasion. 2 It may be useful, nevertheless, to refer to a few cases of
economic regulation in which the problem of evasion has at least been
mentioned.
Sometimes the taint of evasion plays an exaggerated role, either
80 In Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co., 154 Fed. 867 (C.C.N.J. 1903), the complaint
alleged a kind of evasion quite similar to the hypothetical in the text.
81 See Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., 60 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1932) (A. Hand), cited
with approval on this point in Lauritzen v. Larsen, supra note 4.
82 In other countries, a principle that evasion will be struck down has received ex-
press and frequent recognition. See Note, "Fraud on the Law-The Doctrine of Evasion,"
42 Col. L. Rev. 1015 (1942).
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expressly or between the lines. In Gerradin v. United Fruit Co.,"
the question was whether the broad language of the Jones Act which
covers "any seaman" should be limited to cases in which the ship was
registered in the United States. In that context, Judge A. Hand was
of course within bounds in saying that if such a rule were adopted, it
would open up a route for evasion. But there was no occasion there to
decide whether a limited statute should be broadened to encompass a
case of evasion. In State of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank
of N. Y.,"4 the claim was made that foreign bonds should not be sub-
ject to the regulations drawn up under the Trading with the Enemy
Act since they were purchased abroad. The offender was a citizen who
had imported the bonds into the United States, and, again, no exten-
sion of jurisdiction was involved. An executive order under the Act,
however, extended the regulations specifically to "any transaction for
the purpose or which has the effect of evading or avoiding the foregoing
prohibitions." 5 The lower court said, in construing this provision,
that even if the citizen's trip abroad to make the purchase was not
made for the express purpose of evasion, it had that effect, and it
would be unthinkable if he could avoid the prohibition by going across
the border."8 Power existed to regulate a citizen's activities abroad.87
Reluctance to find evasion may be greater in cases involving
criminal sanctions. Despite a quite specific prohibition against sending
radio programs to a transmitter located abroad for rebroadcast to the
United States, a court was unwilling to find evasion in a case of pro-
duction in the United States of records which were then physically sent
to Mexico and broadcast from a Mexican station back to the United
States. 8 The court said that the statute was very specific and by its
terms included only transmission by radio, telephone or loud-speaker
of sounds to another country for rebroadcast to the United States;
it did not include the shipment of records for rebroadcast. Although,
as the court conceded, it may well have been what was intended to be
prohibited, it was not stated with the clarity required for a penal
statute.
The claim of evasion would seem to lose much of its force when
83 Supra note 81.
84 99 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd on this point, 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953).
85 5 Fed. Reg. 1400 (1940), as amended.
86 Compare United States v. Nord Deutscher Lloyd, 223 U.S. 512 (1912); Thomsen
v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917). An express statutory provision drawn with evasion in
mind appears in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 904 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78d (1958), dealing with the use of foreign securities exchanges.
87 The court cited, inter alia, the Vermilya-Brown, Blackmer and Bowman cases,
supra notes 10, 50, 40, respectively. See also Central Vermont Co. v. Durning, 294 U.S.
33 (1935).
88 Baker v. United States, 93 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1937).
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the person sought to be regulated is not a citizen of the United States.
It may be considerably less realistic in such circumstances to argue
that there has been evasion. That is not to say that a foreigner who
stays outside the jurisdiction, but has agents doing acts within the
United States, will be able to rely on the fact that he was acting outside
the jurisdiction. 9 But the case is then not one of evasion; it is simply
one in which the foreigner is acting, although through agents, within
the United StatesY0 Perhaps a distinction between interstate and inter-
national cases can be suggested. It may be, in the generality of cases,
that evasion can be more easily demonstrated in international trans-
actions than in interstate transactions, simply because of the factual
differences between interstate and international mobility.
Brief consideration of this problem, then, suggests at least that
use of a doctrine of evasion is often less a statement of reason in a
particular case than of result. The doctrine may often simply be a
device to justify assumption of jurisdiction where other factors, per-
haps difficult to identify, strongly urge the assumption of jurisdiction.
b) Deference to Foreign Law or Policy-So far the discussion
has been addressed to the factors principally relied on as bases for
applying federal regulatory measures. In Part II, attention was directed
to the power of the regulating authority to hold individuals for activity
or its consequence within the regulating jurisdiction. In Part III, the
focus was on the power of the regulating authority to hold individuals
on the basis of their personal relationship with the regulating jurisdic-
tion. In federal cases, that relationship is most often nationality, and
emphasis was placed on that factor, although other related holds such
as domicile and residence were mentioned. The first subsection of this
part dealt with cases in which jurisdiction was assumed even though
the bases for jurisdiction discussed in Parts II and III were lacking,
when a transaction is found to have been designed to evade regulation
on the basis of one or the other of the holds discussed in Parts II and
III.
The rest of this paper is concerned with a different kind of ques-
tion. It has an analogy in what the conflicts texts call limitations on
the exercise of jurisdiction.The problem here differs because, at least
in form although perhaps less in practice,"' the court is dealing with
jurisdictional limits on the scope of application of a statute. Further,
as was elaborated in the introduction,"2 the court is working with
different alternatives than it may be when it is asked to decline to
s See, e.g., Ford v. United States, supra note 33.
90 Cf. The Sagatind, 11 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1926) (where absence of agents acting
within U.S. may have precluded extraterritorial effect).
91 See text at p. 00, supra.
92 See text at pp. 00, supra.
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assert an existing judicial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, there are similari-
ties, in that the court is asked, despite an existing legislative hold on
the transaction, to construe a statute not to apply when another state
also has legislative jurisdiction and conflicting law or policy.
The only conclusion from the cases which can be stated with any
certainty is that the fact that another country also asserts jurisdiction
cannot be disregarded. The precise circumstances in which the law or
attitude of that other country should be considered so important that
our statute will be found to be inapplicable is largely an uncharted
area. 3 The question has been adverted to but in the main left un-
explored in two recent Supreme Court cases. In Lauritzen v. Larsen,"
the opinion of the Court simply quoted with approval the language in
the Skiriotes case 5 asserting that we are free to govern the conduct of
our citizens upon the high seas or in foreign countries so long as the
rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringedV6 And in
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,97 where a United States citizen was held
to have infringed an American trademark although his only sales were
in Mexico, the fact that his registration of the same trademark in
Mexico had been nullified by the time of the decision saved the Court
from weighing the effect of conflict with Mexican law or rights granted
under Mexican law.98 The Court said, "Where, as here, there can be
no interference with the sovereignty of another nation, the district
court in exercising its equity powers may command persons properly
before it to cease or perform acts outside its territorial jurisdiction."
What, then, would constitute infringement of the rights of other na-
tions or interference with the sovereignty of another nation sufficient
to make us stay our hand?
Once it is recognized that the problem may be to decide which
of the statutes of two or more countries should be applied to a particu-
lar case it is apparent that the court faces a problem much like that
dealt with in the conflict of laws. Choice-of-law rules are designed to
resolve precisely such problems. The courts have recognized the anal-
ogy."' As has already been observed, one fundamental difference be-
tween this question and an ordinary choice-of-law question needs to
93 Compare, Restatement, Foreign Relations Law § 30 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1958);
I Oppenheim, International Law § 127 (8th ed., Lauterpacht, 1955).
94 Supra note 4.
95 Supra note 65.
96 But the Court went on to examine in detail "choice-of-law" factors.
97 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
98 In cases where the foreign trademark of the defendant was not alleged to be
invalid, American courts have deferred. See George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosnetic Co.,
142 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1944); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d
Cir. 1956).
99 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
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be considered. A court faced with the question whether to apply its
regulatory statute does not have the alternative of applying some other
statute as a substitute except where the foreign statute provides private
remedies enforceable by the forum; the choice is simply whether or not
to apply the statute of the forum. 00 The court may have no assurance
that the other state with legislative jurisdiction will prosecute, and
so may feel that the real question before it is whether the conduct
involved will be regulated at all. It is not surprising, then, that the
court might consequently think more concretely about interests of
regulatory and judicial expedience than it would in an ordinary con-
flicts case, where the choice is simply between two rules, one of which
will be applied by this court in this case. Nevertheless, we are not so
provincial that we apply our law in utter disregard of the law and
interests of other nations, and it may be relevant to ascertain what
that law and those interests are.
The most striking and authoritative instance of what may be
called deference to foreign law and policy, or, more accurately, con-
struction of a statute not to apply where another country had a greater
concern with the transaction, is Lauritzen v. Larsen."' There, there
was an injury in one foreign country to a national of a second foreign
country sailing on board a ship of that second country. The sailor, a
Dane, had already begun to receive compensation under Danish law.
In addition to considerable lower court authority, the sailor had a
strong argument for application of the American Jones Act, however,
because he had signed on in New York. Using principles drawn from
the conflict of laws, although certainly not undisputed even in that
area, he could argue that compensation for an injury to a sailor to be
paid by his employer should be classified not as a tort problem, but
as a contracts problem; secondly, if it is a contracts problem, the
place of contracting, here the United States, should determine the
governing law. It is interesting that the court denied the claim by meet-
ing it on its own ground; recognizing that both conflicts arguments
were at best tenuous, the court ranged as broadly and as deeply as
100 See supra note 99. Compare discussion in text, pp. 10-11, supra.
101 Supra note 4. The Lauritzen decision was deemed controlling in a subsequent
case, Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), in which a
Spanish sailor on board a Spanish ship owned by a Spanish corporation was injured
in the United States. The seaman's claim had considerable support in traditional think-
ing, which puts considerable emphasis on the place of injury, and the case consequently
can be taken as another striking example of the Court's putting the decision in conflicts
terms while abandoning traditional conflicts doctrine. A comparison of the two opinions
suggests that in the Romero case, the Court regards the extent of the conflict with
foreign law as being less relevant than it was considered in the Lauritzen case, so that
perhaps conflict will be assumed when the aggregation of contacts points to another
country's law.
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the most unabashed conflicts revisionist could have wished and, in an
explicit and detailed weighing of connecting factors and competing
interests, found that the Jones Act should be construed not to apply.
The case may demonstrate that courts are probably most likely
to entertain an argument that respect should be given foreign law in
cases in which the primary purpose of the federal statute is to extend
or clarify private rights, as in the Jones Act. Further, as might be
expected, the chief instances occur when, as in Lauritzen v. Larsen,
the basic regulatory policies of the two countries are similar, although,
as in Lauritzen v. Larsen, they may differ in detail. Where this is so,
we may well find our statutes inapplicable if either the principle harm
caused by the violation will occur abroad or if, on the whole, the
balance of relative interests of the two countries tips against us. As
to the first, the several acts concerning the labeling of wool products,
standard sizes of containers, etc., regularly exempt articles designed
for export which comply with the foreign law and the specifications
of the purchasers." 2 Similarly, under the Pure Food and Drug Act,
while articles intended for import are still held by customs, they are
entitled to be re-exported instead of being seized as adulterated
goods. 113 And in a case where the right to re-export was contested on
the ground that the adulterated food if re-exported would not comply
with the law of the country to which it was to be re-exported, the court
was willing to presume that the manufacturer, upon receipt of the
food, might well free it of deleterious matter or perhaps divert it to
other uses: "In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it will be as-
sumed that he will comply with the law of Austria."' 4
The second instance suggested above was that the balance of
relative interests of the countries tipped against us. As has already
been seen, explicit deference to the foreign law has occurred in trade-
mark infringement cases. In one, infringement in the United States
and in various foreign countries was found, but the court specifically
relieved the defendant of damages for infringement in countries in
which he had established his right to use the trademark as against the
plaintiff, even though acts contributing to the infringement abroad
were done in the U.S.""5 The court said that the injunction and ac-
counting should not cover countries or "acts in the United States
resulting in a sale of merchandise in a foreign country under a mark
to which the defendant has established, over the plaintiff's opposition,
a legal right of use in that country."' 6 In another case, the Court of
102 For examples, see BREWSTER 316 n.15.
103 See supra note 28.
104 United States v. Catz American Co., 53 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 1931).
105 George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co., 142 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1944).
106 Cf. Ingenohl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541 (1927).
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Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a dismissal by the court below
of claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition in Canada.
Although there was power to hear these claims, "this power should be
exercised with great reluctance when it will be difficult to secure com-
pliance with any resulting decree or when the exercise of such power
is fraught with possibilities of discord and conflict with the authorities
of another country."' °7
Another instance of the utility of a "relative interests" test might
be the case in which the foreign interest, admittedly in conflict with
ours, is obviously much stronger than ours. Consider, for example, a
small but highly industrialized country whose principal business, aside
from tourism, is the manufacture of optical lenses. Let us suppose that
these lenses are the best for their price in the world. The economy of
the country revolves about the manufacture of these lenses, and the
position of the country in international trade depends heavily on their
export and on maintenance of their price abroad. The government in
that country has lent official support to a working agreement among
various manufacturers of the lenses in order to help maintain the
quality and price of the lenses. In the United States, these lenses
compete with lenses made in many other countries, including Germany,
Japan and the United States itself. If we do not rely heavily on the
lenses for defense purposes, in which case of course a different situa-
tion might be presented, it is not difficult to argue that our interest in
the maintenance of competition, at least, although it is plainly affected
by the foreign agreement, is relatively slight compared to that coun-
try's interest in the agreement. In such a situation we may well find an
American statute prohibiting such an agreement inapplicable, at least
unless we find the foreign law or policy on the question so inimical that
we would disregard it on grounds of public policy or its underlying
public purpose.""'
In bankruptcy proceedings involving a foreign corporation having
assets in many countries, where the interest of the foreign country is
not so much a governmental interest as one simply in the efficient
and equitable winding up of a company, the fact that assets are located
in the United States may not be enough to justify bankruptcy pro-
ceedings here. Despite strong differences of opinion in various coun-
tries concerning the place where a bankrupt's property should be
administered, for example, the tendency is said to be increasingly
107 Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 647 (2d Cir. 1956). See,
generally, Wengler, "Laws Concerning Unfair Competition and the Conflict of Laws,"
4 Am. J. Comnp. L. 167 (1955); Derenberg, Territorial Scope and Situs of Trade-
marks and Goodwill, in XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law 419 (1961).
10s See, generally, Restatement, Foreign Relations Law §§ 28b, 28e (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1960). These possible reasons for disregarding foreign law will be discussed later.
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toward recognition and acceptance of the foreign administration at
the principle place of business, so long as there is some assurance that
local creditors will not be put at a disadvantage by transmission of
the assets to a bankruptcy administration abroad."0 9 As will be dis-
cussed in greater detail somewhat later, even in such difficult areas as
expropriation and exchange controls, the obvious foreign interest may
prevail. "[M]ore than once in recent years [it has been decided]
that expropriation or requisition may operate extra-territorially pro-
vided that they are not contrary to public policy."" 0 American and
English cases involving exchange controls make the question of recog-
nition of another country's exchange controls turn on much the same
kind of test as that employed in Lauritzen v. Larsen. If the transaction
is primarily centered in the jurisdiction having exchange controls, there
is a good chance that the exchange control regulations of that jurisdic-
tion will be recognized elsewhere." Use of such an approach is par-
ticularly interesting in the face of the facts that exchange controls
are inherently discriminatory against foreigners, that they often are
in substance, although not in form, confiscatory, and that they involve
governmental measures which, in an ordinary conflicts case, another
sovereign would not assist in enforcing.
It would serve no purpose here to attempt a detailed survey of
the state of the law today as to the recognition of foreign law in such
diverse areas as trademarks, monetary controls, expropriation and
bankruptcy or to seek to identify the points of difference in the at-
titudes in these various areas. They are mentioned only because they
are fields of current importance and ones in which support may be
found for generalizations concerning the extent to which accommoda-
tions of conflicting law and policy are being made. Nothing more
need be said here than that there is an identifiable tendency in these
areas, and of course to a greater extent in some than in others, to
look to the kinds of factors usually considered relevant in the private
transactions typically dealt with in the conflict of laws and to weigh
the groupings of those factors against the hold and interest of the
forum in the transaction. Jurisdictional power over events or prop-
erty within the territory is no longer the ultimate test but increasingly
only one factor to be considered along with the relative policies and
'09 Cf. Nadelmann, "Revision of Conflicts Provisions in the American Bankruptcy
Act," 1 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 484 (1952); "Bankruptcy in English Private International
Law-II," 4 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 1, 170 (1955).
110 See van Hecke, "Confiscations, Expropriation and the Conflict of Laws," 4 Int.
L.Q. 345, 350 (1951). See Lorentzen v. Lydden, [1942] 2 K.B. 202; and cases cited,
supra notes 105, 107; Wolff, Private International Law 358.
111 See, e.g., Kahler v. Midland Bank Ltd., [1950] A.C. 24 (H.L. 1949); Perutz v.
Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d 6 (1953).
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the significance of the transactions to the various jurisdictions con-
cerned.
Even when we would not like to defer to the foreign law, enforce-
ment may require cooperation abroad, and the degree of recognition
which other countries accord may affect the decision to prosecute or
the remedy used. If we would otherwise outlaw activity, to what extent
do we take account of the fact that effective enforcement will require
the cooperation of foreign courts and the possibility that the foreign
courts may demur to our orders, because of what they consider juris-
dictional overreaching? Certainly no general predictions can be made
as to the probable attitude of foreign courts. Apart from confiscations,
cases involving American antitrust decrees have arisen but hardly
afford adequate basis for prediction." 2
Once the relevance of foreign interests is recognized, however, the
possibility of an important kind of practical compromise suggests it-
self. That is to see whether the principal interests of the respective
countries can be accommodated by breaking the transaction down into
separate components rather than assuming that regulation of the entire
transaction must be allocated to a single jurisdiction. There are many
cases in which the transaction can effectively be regulated piecemeal
and, as a consequence, the problem of conflicting regulation overcome.
By way of illustration, some of the trademark cases are again help-
ful." 3 We may well find violation only as to infringements in the
United States; we may, at least, specifically find no violation as to
infringements in countries in which the defendant has a superior right
to the plaintiff's trademark. And whatever we find as to violation, we
can well afford in many instances to confine the remedy to those areas
in which our policy does not conflict with the policy of another country.
Except at the remedy stage, however, it may be difficult for a
court to find statutory authority for this kind of selective application
of a regulatory statute. On the other hand, there are undoubtedly
many instances of practical compromise worked out when govern-
mental authorities other than courts are involved. This is an area in
which a great deal of research is needed. It may be helpful, however,
by way of illustration, to refer to one instance in which such a prac-
tical compromise was worked out. A tunnel runs between Detroit,
Michigan, and Windsor, Ontario. A number of people are employed
in maintaining the tunnel and in running buses back and forth through
the tunnel. Some of the employees are American citizens and some are
112 E.g., British Nylon Spinners v. Imperial Chem. Industries, Ltd., [1952] 2 All
E.R. 780 (CA.), 66 Harv. L. Rev. 924 (1953), 2 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 143 (1953); cf.
Holophane Co. v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1955), aff'd per curiam,
352 U.S. 903 (1956).
113 See the text n.105, supra.
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Canadians. Some work entirely on the American side, some work
entirely on the Canadian side, and some pass back and forth. Both
the United States and Canada have extensive labor legislation, in-
cluding a process by which unions are certified for collective bargain-
ing purposes. Should the American or Canadian labor board have
jurisdiction to certify a union for these employees? The question
became crucial when one union commanded a majority of the American
workers and a rival a majority of the Canadian workers. The solution
was found, apparently after an informal exchange of letters between
the American and Canadian labor boards, in division of the employees
first according to place of employment and, where that test failed,
according to nationality, so that the American board certified a union
for American citizens passing back and forth through the tunnel and
all employees working on the American side, and the Canadian board
certified a union for Canadians passing back and forth through the
tunnel and all persons employed on the Canadian side." 4 Whether
this is a satisfactory solution for this particular problem, it is a kind
of solution which might well be helpful in a number of areas.
c) Limitations on Deference to Foreign Law or Policy-As one
draws more heavily on choice-of-law solutions for determination of
the problem of jurisdictional propriety, one is forced to deal with
certain objections to recognition of foreign law which are familiar in
the conflict of laws. To what extent does a judge, who has, let us say,
found that the law of another country also having legislative jurisdic-
tion conflicts with ours and represents a much stronger policy than
our regulation, feel bound to defer to that law, even when it is of a
sort which would not be applied in a conflicts case in the United States
either because it represents an exercise of public purpose or because
it contravenes our public policy? These two objections go to the kind
of regulation involved and the possibility of great dissimilarity be-
tween the regulatory policies of the interested countries.
The first objection involves what have come to be known as
penal or governmental measures. An ancient maxim of private inter-
national law-unfortunately still of unbelievable vigor" 6L-asserts that
no sovereign enforces the penal or revenue laws of another sovereign." 6
114 Letter to author of January 30, 1956, from counsel, Hans J. Lehmann, Esq.
Earlier formal proceedings before the Board had resulted in certification of a unit
composed of all persons working at least part of the time in the United States, I.r.o.
Detroit & Canada Tunnel Corp., 83 N.L.R.B. 727 (1949), as requested by the petitioning
American union, see Brief in Behalf of Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. and
Motor Coach Employees of Am., A.F.L., Div. 1303, submitted by 0. David Zimring, Esq.
115 See In re Delhi Electric Supply and Traction Co., [1954] Ch. 131 (CA.), aff'd
[19551 1 All E.R. 292 (H.L.).
116 See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 610 (1934): "No action can be maintained
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Based in part on an uneasy notion that governments in all logic suffer
an indignity if they act as the enforcement agencies of other govern-
ments, the rule has far outrun its discriminatory purpose. On the
other hand, it may make sense, even today, to resort to the public
or governmental nature of a foreign measure, as a defense against
giving it any effect, where the case involves monetary controls, con-
fiscations based on policies of nationalization or racial discrimination,
or other similar measures designed to enhance the power or further
the unpalatable policies of another sovereign. 11 7 The court may proper-
ly either decline to entertain the action or refuse to recognize the
foreign rule. But then the objection is really far more a true "public
policy" one, going to the repugnance of the foreign rule, rather than
an objection to the public nature of the regulation. Even this brand
of "public policy," however, is limited. Confiscations and dismissals
from employment contracts, for example, based on Nazi racial pro-
visions, have been recognized in our courts despite the plain dissimi-
larity of policy." 8
It is plain that these kinds of objections to recognition of foreign
law in conflicts cases can also be made when a court is called upon to
withdraw our own regulation in the face of foreign regulation. Just
what weight these objections should be given, however, when a ques-
tion of jurisdiction is involved, is not so clear. It would seem, however,
that they should probably be given somewhat less weight. The degree
of assistance given by deferring to foreign law is of a different order
than that involved in an enforcement of the foreign law. Certainly
when the objection is that the foreign measure is a governmental or
penal measure, it should be far less offensive to us to stay our hand
than to be called upon to assist the foreign government. On the other
hand, where the objection is to the basic policy underlying the regula-
tion, it is not so clear that the objection should carry much less weight
than it does in a conflicts case, although, again, we are simply dis-
missing the case rather than giving affirmative relief on the basis of a
repugnant law. In any event, the "public policy" objection is one which
has perhaps been used much more often than necessary in conflicts
cases themselves, and it would seem that a court should be very careful
before relying on this reason for refusing to defer to a foreign law.
on a right created by the law of a foreign state as a method of furthering its own
governmental interests."
117 Even this proposition is limited. In Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v.
United States Steel Corp., 267 U.S. 22 (1924), the Supreme Court stated "there is no
conflict in matter of fact or matter of law," and English seizure of shares in an American
corporation was upheld as against former enemy holders.
118 See, e.g., Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 147 N.E.2d
798 (1938); Note, "Should Judicial Respect be Accorded to Nazi Acts of State," 47 Col.
L. Rev. 1061 (1947).
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One recent case, State of The Netherlands v. Federal Reserve
Bank of N. Y.," 9 serves to highlight the issues. In 1940, the Nether-
lands government in exile issued decrees vesting protective title in
the State of the Netherlands to all securities of natural or legal
domiciliaries of the Netherlands. Although that decree had been recog-
nized as to property located in New York, on the ground that it was
not confiscatory and was in keeping with our policy,' the lower court
held that the decree could not affect property which was within the
occupied territory at the time, although it had later come into the
United States. Recognition of the decree, the district judge said, would
have the effect of upsetting normal transactions within the occupied
territory. Since the aim of the decree was clearly partisan, it was clear
that it would not have been implemented by the occupying power."'
Even though title came through a Nazi liquidator in the Netherlands
who had taken over the property of all Jewish residents of the Nether-
lands under an "Ordinance for the Elimination of Jews from Economic
Life," the Dutch government was not now entitled to the bonds al-
though presumably the original holders would prevail over those hold-
ing under the Nazi confiscation. 22
The Court of Appeals, characterizing the attitude of the lower
court as a "mid-nineteenth century view," reversed and directed entry
of judgment for the State of the Netherlands. It did not agree that the
case of a decree of a government in exile affecting securities held in
the United States necessarily differed from the case where the decree
affected securities in the exiled government's occupied territory. After
noting that in Cities Service Co. v. McGrath,'123 the Supreme Court had
held certain debts evidenced by bearer bonds of American corporations
to be located within the United States for purposes of vesting under
the Trading with the Enemy Act, the court argued that it was equally
appropriate in this case to determine the situs of the debt by the
residence of the corporate debtor, here the United States, rather than
by the location of the certificates. Evidently then the case could pro-
ceed without regard to whether the Netherlands decree would have
been recognized in the occupied territory. The decreeing government
119 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953).
120 Anderson v. N. B. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502
(1942); see also, Lorentzen v. Lydden & Co., Ltd., [1942] 2 K.B. 202 (similar decree
of Norwegian government in exile) ; but see, cases cited in note 122, infra.
121 See, generally, Fraleigh, "The Validity of Acts of Enemy Occupation Authorities
Affecting Property Rights," 35 Corn. L.Q. 89 (1949). Cf. United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat.
246, 254 (U.S. 1819).
122 For comment on the decision of the lower court and a similar recent English
case denying recognition to the Netherlands decree, Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart v.
Slatford, [1951] 2 All E.R. 779 (K.B.), see 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1463 (1952).
123 342 U.S. 330 (1952).
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was friendly to us, and there was no reason of public policy for not
recognizing its decree.'24 Even if the situs of the bonds was the place
where the certificates were located, the court found the Netherlands
decree effective under international law as to property in occupied
territory. The court seemed to be of the view that even a hostile
decree may be effective, and hence is to be recognized elsewhere, when
it "merely implements a restriction upon the occupant" against con-
fiscation of private property imposed by international law controls.125
One further possible objection to deference to the foreign law
deserves brief mention. That is whether Congress might have intended
our legislation to be inapplicable in the face of conflicting foreign
regulation only if the foreign country would likewise withdraw if the
circumstances were reversed. Judicial development of any such re-
ciprocity doctrine is unlikely," 6 although legislative resort to reciproc-
ity doctrine is quite frequent.127 In cases quite similar to many of
those directly involved here, the question whether the foreign country
would defer to our law in like circumstances has been said to be not
relevant. 28 In contrasting judgments with seizures by a foreign coun-
try, Judge L. Hand has said: "A judgment involves the direct action
of a court against individuals, and offers more excuse for national
jealousy than when the obligation arises from laws of general applica-
tion. So far as I know; the doctrine of reciprocity has been confined
to foreign judgments alone, and has no application to situations of
124 For a suggestion that the recent Slat!ord case in England, supra note 122,
involved a conflict between the English and Dutch interests and could have been distin-
guished on that ground, see 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1463, 1465 (1952).
125 See Hague Regulations, art. 43.
126 Courts have evolved a reciprocity doctrine for foreign judgments which almost
all now regret. Compare Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); with Johnston v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926).
127 Reciprocity provisions in statutes often occur in the form of authorizations to
the executive to deny U.S. privileges to foreigners whose countries deny our citizens
similar privileges. See 39 Stat. 799 (1916), 15 U.S.C. §§ 75-76 (1958), giving the
President power to forbid the import of articles into the United States where a foreign
country forbids imports of similar U.S. products "not injurious to health or morals"
or does so "contrary" to the law and practice of nations. For further examples, see
BREwsTER 340 n.102.
128 See Direction der Disconto-GeselIschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 300 Fed.
741, 747 S.D.N.Y. (1924), aff'd, 267 U.S. 22 (1925), where L. Hand, D.J. said: "Finally,
the plaintiffs argue that we should not recognize captures made in the United Kingdom
until it appears that the nation extends a like recognition to captures here. The point
depends upon a misunderstanding of the effect of the case of Hilton v. Guyot. [Citations
omitted]. Whatever may be thought of that decision, the court certainly did not mean
to hold that an American court was to recognize no obligations or duties arising else-
where until it appeared that the sovereign of the locus reciprocally recognized similar
obligations here. That doctrine I am happy to say is not a part of American jurispru-
dence.... [Here followed the quotation given in the text.]"
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this sort." 2 9 Although Judge Hand was addressing himself solely to
a case in which recognition of a capture was involved, his reasoning
would seem to have more general implication, particularly in that he
singles out the coercive nature of recognition of a judgment as some-
thing with which each sovereign is concerned. That problem, of course,
would not be involved ordinarily when a court is simply asked to dis-
miss an action because the foreign concern is greater. And, here again,
it can be said of reciprocity, as of "public policy," that we are dealing
with an old but aging doctrine which many hope is losing its vitality.
Unless the reciprocity doctrine represents simply a general notion of
mutual respect for other countries' laws, a premise on which all of
this discussion is based, it could grow into an impossible idea. Con-
sider, for example, the onetime provision of our trademark legislation
that an alien could register a trademark here if an American could,
under the same circumstances, register a trademark in the alien's
home country. An alien attempted to register here a trademark for
cigars. 30 In Italy, his home country, the production of cigars was a
state monopoly, so that an American citizen could have no occasion
to register a trademark there. Is there a lack of reciprocity here? It is
submitted that reciprocity plays a worthwhile role only as a very
general notion of mutual respect for the rights of foreigners, rather
than as a technical trap denying, for example, the Italian a right to
register a trademark for cigars.
Finally, although some experience in tailoring the exercise of
jurisdiction to foreign law and interest exists, much of what has been
discussed in this part could, on occasion at least, make a court
apprehensive that a just decision required examination of the fairness
of the foreign law and the fairness of its attempted application. Such
an inquiry, it can forcefully be argued, is unseemly; the potentiality
for embarrassment among sovereigns is such that a court should refuse
altogether to embark on the inquiry, although in cases of flagrant
violation, where no such inquiry is necessary, injustice might result.
This kind of argument is often present when a court examines a foreign
rule in an ordinary choice-of-law case.' 3' But, again, it would seem far
less offensive for a court to make the negative determination that the
foreign law is such that our legislative policy should not defer to it
than to make the determination that it cannot be enforced in our
courts. Further, to refuse to embark on the inquiry for this reason
raises the familiar question of the wisdom of a rule designed to obviate
129 Supra note 128.
130 See De Nobili v. Scanda, 198 Fed. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1912).
131 E.g., Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 603 (2d Cir. 1929) (concurring opinion)
(action for taxes), aff'd, 281 U.S. 18 (1930), and cases involving penal laws and those
offensive to public policy.
[Vol. 22
AMERICAN REGULATORY LEGISLATION
the necessity in any case of becoming involved in a job for which
the judiciary is unsuited.
CONCLUSION
The traditional holds for defining legislative jurisdiction, in terms
of activity and status, have proven unworkable. Although departures
from these tests may involve a delicate balancing process which is
objectionable if it leaves the judge at large or if others cannot under-
stand what principles guide decision, sporadic escape by the judge
from rigid rules will ordinarily in fact be, and certainly to others will
seem to be, even more capricious. A large common sense, which loses
its strength with attempts to pin it down too rigidly, is obviously
called for. Doubtless the kinds of judgments to be made by a court
under a conflicts approach as suggested in part IV may on occasion
prove to be delicate, particularly to the extent that they involve for-
eign affairs in the public sense. The wisdom of using judicial ma-
chinery for the solution of these problems, as against international
convention or case-by-case diplomatic interchange, will depend on
evaluation of the feasibility of making other devices effective for the
solution of various regulatory conflicts. It is intended here only to
point out that there have been instances in the past in which we have
relied on the courts for solution of these problems. And fortunately,
no black-and-white choice need be made; the courts are quite capable
of distinguishing those situations in which a wolf cry of "international
relations" is not worth hearing from those in which delicate public
international problems are in fact involved.
The alternative to judicial inquiry into these problems is simply
nonexistent and must be rejected unless a clear danger emerges. This
will be particularly so if the courts are to continue to do what this
writer thinks they have been doing so far in dealing with what has
come to be known as the territorial principle. If that principle sug-
gests that it is appropriate to reach any transaction a part of which
occurs in the United States, then the courts will certainly continue,
and properly so, to cut down the reach of our regulation by reference
to foreign interest and foreign policy. As Lauritzen v. Larsen demon-
strates, a court will rebel at applying our law on the basis of a suf-
ficient territorial hold when a large proportion of the factors suggested
in this paper, especially in Part IV, look the other way.
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